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185 Output of oil is to be doubled, of iron and steel nearly doubled. Though the socialization of agriculture is of course to be pushed, Mme. Pauker said nothing about class warfare in the villages nor did she emphasize the leading rôle of the industrial proletariat, as had been done by other satellite leaders as well as by her own colleagues in the Central Committee, Georgescu and Luca.

185 Perhaps geography supplies an answer to why Moscow slated
648 Rumania but not Jugoslavia and Bulgaria for industrialization. The latter are more distant from Soviet Russia and would be much more exposed to enemy air attack in case of war. Rumania adjoins the Soviet Union; and although it is true that her oil fields were bombed from North Africa and Italy in the last war, they could be given air protection more easily than could the industrial installations in the other two countries. The same considerations apply, though in less degree, to Hungary; but in any case industrialization there was already considerably advanced. Rumania and Hungary, moreover, were destined in the Soviet planning to remain indefinitely under occupation by Soviet troops.

The favor shown by Soviet planners for developing heavy industry even in situations where it seems particularly unnatural, as in Rumania, is partly inspired, of course, by their desire to proletarianize the population as quickly as possible. But more important, perhaps, it also will increase the dependence of the satellites on the Soviet Union. Where else but in Russia can they hope to dispose of the product?

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626 Despite all their adversities, present and planned, the peasants nevertheless remain the great—probably the only—obstacle to Rumania's full Sovietization. All over Southeast Europe farming is more a way of life than an occupation, and nowhere is this truer than in Rumania. Coercion will gradually break the Rumanian peasant of this way of life. As we have seen, however, the régime has so far made no claims to spectacular progress. Evidence that formidable difficulties are being encountered is found in the fact that while Georgescu, Luca and others stress complete proletarianization as the goal and hint at violent methods to attain it, they make excuses for not proceeding faster; and at the same time there continues to be conciliatory talk about getting the "freely given consent of the peasants."

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Evidently this is only one of the *façons de parler* which Revai explained are permissible when it is inconvenient to call things "by their real names." Someday naked force will become convenient, and then the peasants will have to give in or starve. Their remarkable toughness is shown by the fact that they have been able to sustain their present position so long. With an egg selling at 2 lei and shoes costing 2,400 lei, a farmer must sell a hundred dozen eggs to get himself a new pair of shoes; and it takes a year's crop of wheat (in a good season at that) for the owner of an average-size farm to pay for a suit of store clothes. Tough as they are, the majority who still stand aside will have to knuckle under eventually and give up their land. Others will be channelled off to work on state construction jobs, and others again will be absorbed into factories. Some doubtless will hold out to the end—angry, bewildered and inarticulate, helpless to do anything but die. Millions died in Russia.

Nationalism will also continue to be something of a factor, but in Rumania it probably will not give the Communists particular trouble. Rumanians have always considered Russia an enemy of the Rumanian nation. But if nationalism can be held in check in countries with much greater native capacities of resistance, Poland for instance, how much less chance is there for it to remain alive and aggressive here in Rumania—the first of the satellites to come under Soviet occupation, the first to receive a Communist-controlled government imposed by Moscow, the one which today comes closest to being on the same political level as the Ukrainian or the Usbek Soviet Socialist Republic?

In March 1950 Patrascanu's name came back into public discussion as a result of reports in *Borba* and other Belgrade journals that he was to be made the chief performer in a spectacular trial on the Rajk and Kostov model. The reason these predictions did not materialize probably was that Moscow did not see pressing reasons to give Rumania any more lessons for the present. If Patrascanu should be tried later for nationalism, Titoism or spying for the West it would be because the people were starving and because when bread is lacking they must be given a circus. It will not indicate that there is (or probably ever has been) a very strong current of inde-